Recent research on the neural bases of decision making has focused on the role of the striatum and dopamine in learning to predict and obtain rewards. These studies have illuminated the processes by which repeated experiences of choice and reward feedback lead to the updating of value representations, allowing an organism to use past experience to improve choices when encountering the same situation. However, in a constantly changing environment, choices may not repeat themselves. Instead, decisions often involve novel contexts and options, requiring flexible generalization of past experience to novel choices. Extensive evidence from studies of the neural bases of learning and memory suggests that flexible use of learned knowledge depends on a "declarative" memory system in the hippocampus. Investigations of the neural bases of decision making and of memory systems have developed largely independently of each other. However, there are a number of important links between them, at both the brain and behavioral levels. Here, we briefly review these two literatures and propose a critical role for the hippocampus in decision making when past experience must be flexibly generalized to new situations. Further, we suggest that dopamine modulates learning in both the striatum and the hippocampus, with these two systems working together to adaptively guide choices. Finally, we present behavioral evidence from a novel paradigm designed to probe the role of hippocampal-dependent memory in decision making. The findings demonstrate that past experience can flexibly guide decision making in novel contexts, indicating a possible cooperation between reinforcement history and declarative memories in guiding decision making.
neurophysiological, neurochemical, and neurocomputational properties of dopaminecontaining midbrain neurons and their striatal targets (e.g., Bayer and Glimcher, 2005 ; Beiser and Houk, 1998 ; Daw and Doya, 2006 ; Daw et al., 2005 ; Schultz et al., 1997 ) . Collectively, these studies suggest that midbrain dopamine neurons are critical for learning to predict reward . Together with numerous studies suggesting an important role for the striatum and dopamine in reinforcement-based learning in humans (e.g. Aron et al., 2004 ; Delgado et al., 2000 ; Frank et al., 2004 ; Hare et al., 2008 ; Kirsch et al., 2003 ; Knutson et al., 2001 ; McClure et al., 2004 ; O'Doherty, 2004 ; Pessiglione et al., 2006 ; Shohamy et al., 2004a ) , this literature emphasizes that decision making and learning are highly interconnected -that dopamine modulation of the striatum allows past experiences to drive future choices.
Importantly, midbrain dopamine neurons also project to other brain systems that are important for learning, such as the hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal lobe (MTL) cortices (Gasbarri et al., 1994 ) -regions known to play a key role in long-term memory (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993 ; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ; Eichenbaum et al., 2007 ; Gabrieli, 1998 ; Paller and Wagner, 2002 ; Squire, 1987 Squire, , 1992 Wagner et al., 1998 ) . Traditionally, the hippocampus and the striatum were thought to play distinct and independent roles in learning, supporting two independent "memory systems" (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ; Gabrieli, 1998 ; Schacter, 1990 ; Schacter and Graf, 1986 ) . However, the common input from midbrain dopamine neurons poses a challenge to this view, and suggests that both regions may contribute to learning-based decision making. Thus, a critical question is whether memory processes subserved by the hippocampus also contribute to decision making, and if so, what is the unique contribution of each system?
Here we review existing data regarding the role of the hippocampus and the striatum in learning, and their modulation by dopamine, in order to provide a broader understanding of how learning guides decision making. In particular, we suggest that, while the striatum supports decisions based on gradual stimulus-response learning, the hippocampus supports decisions that depend upon episodic, contextual information and mnemonic flexibility. Finally, we describe an experiment with a novel paradigm that investigates the role of hippocampal-dependent memory processes in decision making, and demonstrate that representational processes characteristic of episodic memory emerge in the context of a reward-based decision-making task.
Multiple mechanisms for memory-guided choice
Choices are often thought to be driven by value. For example, deciding between eating at a restaurant that serves sushi or one that serves tapas may involve accessing associated values, comparing the values, and selecting the option with the highest value (Rangel et al., 2008 ) . A central question is how values are impacted by past experience.
One way in which past experience may modulate value associations is simply by the history of outcomes associated with a particular event. If a given restaurant has usually provided a rewarding experience, we are likely to choose it again. Recent studies of the neural bases of decision making have focused on this type of learning, exploring how past repeated encounters with a stimulus influence its neural and cognitive representations and the likelihood of choosing the stimulus again (Montague et al., 2006 ; Rangel et al., 2008 ) . These studies have shown that midbrain dopamine and its modulation of the striatum play a critical role in driving both learning and choice. In particular, converging evidence from animals and humans suggests that midbrain dopamine neurons code for a prediction error -the extent to which a received reward deviates from what would be expected, given past experience (Schultz et al., 1997 ) . Computationally, this type of learning is well described by temporal difference (TD) reinforcement learning models, a class of models that employ reward prediction error signals to make predictions about the value of stimuli (Dayan and Abbott, 2001 ; Sutton and Barto, 1998 ) . However, past experience may impact choices, even when considering options that have never been directly experienced. For example, decisions in novel settings are often driven by generalizing from the past -by applying past knowledge towards future novel situations (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993 ; Eichenbaum, 2000 ; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008 ) . In such cases, decisions may be guided by the context, by the relationship between novel choices and past ones, or by an abstract ability to imagine each choice and its likely outcome (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007 ) . In all of these situations, decisions are driven not by the value associated with a single, previously encountered stimulus, but by structured representation of the relations between multiple stimuli and the context in which they were experienced.
As reviewed below, there is ample evidence to suggest that that such memory-guided choice is dependent on representational processes in the hippocampus. To understand how this view emerges from existing literature, we first review evidence regarding the distinct contribution of the striatum and the hippocampus to different forms of learning and memory, with a focus on bridging between mnemonic and decision-making processes. We then turn more specifically to a discussion of dopamine modulation of the hippocampus and the possible role of episodic memory processes in decision making.
Multiple memory systems in the brain
Decades of research into the neural bases of learning and memory suggest that these different forms of memory-guided choice depend on representations formed by distinct cognitive and neural systems. Extensive evidence indicates that the MTL (particularly the hippocampus and surrounding cortices) supports the rapid acquisition of long-term, explicit memories for events or episodes -often described as "declarative" memory (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993 ; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ; Schacter and Wagner, 1999 ; Squire, 1987 Squire, , 1992 . The striatum, by contrast, is thought to support an independent and dissociable system for gradual learning of stimulus-response associations over many trials -a form of non-declarative memory often referred to as "procedural" or "habit" learning (Gabrieli, 1998 ; Knowlton et al., 1996 ; Robbins, 1996 ; White, 1997 ) .
The idea that there are different forms of memory that are subserved by different systems has been prominent in the cognitive and neural sciences for decades (Eichenbaum Gabrieli, 1998 ; Schacter, 1990 ; Schacter and Graf, 1986 ) . Much of the evidence in favor of this view comes from the demonstration of a dissociation in the pattern of memory impairments following damage to the MTL and damage to the striatum, in both humans and animals. In humans, striatal disruption (such as occurs in Parkinson's disease) impairs performance on a variety of incremental, stimulus-response learning tasks (Downes et al., 1989 ; Knowlton et al., 1996 ; Owen et al., 1993 ; Saint-Cyr et al., 1988 ; Shohamy et al., 2004a Shohamy et al., , 2004b Shohamy et al., , 2005 Shohamy et al., , 2006 Swainson et al., 2000 ) , but spares performance on tasks that involve declarative memory (Knowlton et al., 1996 ) . The opposite pattern is observed following damage to the MTL: striking declarative memory deficits, but spared incremental learning of stimulus-response associations (Gabrieli, 1998 ; Knowlton et al., 1996 ) . Animal lesion studies provide further support for the multiple memory systems framework. Combining lesions of either the MTL or the striatum with behavioral tasks that probe either spatial-relational learning or habit learning, these studies have shown that an intact MTL is essential for the former, while the striatum (specifically, the caudate) is essential for the latter (Kesner et al., 1993 ; McDonald and White, 1993 ; Packard, 1999 ; Packard et al., 1989 ; Packard and McGaugh, 1996 ) ; see Poldrack and Packard, 2003 for review) . These animal studies have additionally shown that inactivating one system, in some cases, improves the performance of the type of memory supported by the other system (Lee et al., 2008 ; Poldrack and Packard, 2003 ) , suggesting that these two systems not only support different kinds of learning, but also that in some situations the learning processes supported by the striatum and MTL competitively interact.
The striatum and feedback-based, incremental learning
Recent studies have sought to provide a more direct link between the role of the striatum in stimulus-response learning and the evidence that dopamine neurons encode a reward prediction error (Montague et al., 1996 ; Schultz et al., 1997 ) , an essential learning signal used to update estimates of value. Building on this theoretical and electrophysiological research, studies have indicated that the striatum may be particularly important for learning that involves repeated reward feedback (including feedback that may rapidly shift, as in reversal) (Aron et al., 2004 ; Cools et al., 2002 ; Poldrack et al., 2001 ; Schonberg et al.; Shohamy et al., 2004a Shohamy et al., , 2005 or learning the correct sequences of choices that lead to reward (Nagy et al., 2007 ; Schendan et al., 2003 ; Shohamy et al., 2005 ; Suri and Schultz, 1998 ) .
More specific insight into the role of dopamine in learning comes from studies examining the effect of dopaminergic medication on learning in Parkinson's patients. In such studies, patients are tested on the same learning task either "on" or "off" dopaminereplacement therapy. Consistent with computational models of dopamine and the striatum, these studies reveal that dopamine may have differential effects on learning, depending on whether or not learning depends heavily on response-contingent feedback (Shohamy et al., 2004a (Shohamy et al., , 2006 , and more specifically, depending on whether learning is driven by reward vs. punishment (Cools et al., 2006 ; Frank et al., 2004 ; Moustafa et Palminteri et al., 2009 ). These studies suggest that patients tested "off" medication showed improvements in learning from punishment, but impairment in learning from reward, relative to controls, while patients "on" medication exhibit the opposite pattern (Frank et al., 2004 ) . Functional imaging (fMRI) studies in humans similarly suggest that the fMRI BOLD signal (henceforth, "activation") in the ventral striatum reflects the magnitude of anticipated reward (Delgado et al., 2000 ; Knutson et al., 2001 ) and deviations from expected reward outcomes, i.e. a reward prediction error signal (Delgado et al., 2005b ; McClure et al., 2003 ; O'Doherty et al., 2003 ; Pessiglione et al., 2006 ) that is thought to originate in the phasic firing of striatum-projecting midbrain dopamine neurons (D'Ardenne et al., 2008 ; Knutson and Gibbs, 2007 ; Zaghloul et al., 2009 ). The dopaminergic prediction error signal then updates values associated with stimuli, these representations may reside in the ventral or orbital prefrontal cortex or in the striatum itself (Hare et al., 2008 ; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006 ; Samejima et al., 2005 ) . Subsequent decisions, informed by recent reward experience (e.g., reversal learning) or by pre-existing value associations (e.g., purchasing products) have been shown to be predicted from BOLD activity in the ventral striatum, anterior cingulate, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex -regions hypothesized to represent value (Hampton and O'Doherty J, 2007 ; Knutson et al., 2007 ; Plassmann et al., 2007 ) .
The hippocampus and episodic, relational learning
Extensive, converging evidence indicates that the hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal cortices subserve the rapid formation of memories for single episodes (Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993 ; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ; Eichenbaum et al., 2007 ; Gabrieli, 1998 ; Paller and Wagner, 2002 ; Squire, 1987 Squire, , 1992 Wagner et al., 1998 ) . In humans, damage to the MTL results in a highly specific memory deficit that renders new episodic learning impaired while sparing other learning processes Squire, 1980, 1981; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ; Gabrieli, 1998 ; Squire, 1992 ) . Similarly, in animals, damage to the MTL leads to specific impairments in rapid learning of arbitrary associations between co-occurring stimuli, while gradual learning of stimulus-response associations remains intact (e.g., (Eichenbaum et al., 1990 ; Squire, 1987 Squire, , 1992 . Functional imaging studies in healthy individuals further indicate a tight link between MTL activation and the formation of episodic memories. For example, fMRI studies have demonstrated that memory for single-trial events relates to neural activity occurring during encoding of those events (Brewer et al., 1998 ; Kirchhoff et al., 2000 ; Otten et al., 2001 ; Schacter and Wagner, 1999 ; Wagner et al., 1998 ) .
Extensive evidence from humans and animals suggests that MTL-based episodic memories have two key characteristics. First, the memory representations are relational , in that they contain information about spatial, temporal, or associative relations between multiple stimuli (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ; Eichenbaum et al., 2007 ; Staresina and Davachi, 2009 contexts (Cohen, 1984 ; Cohen and Eichenbaum, 1993 ; Eichenbaum, 2000 ) . For example, animals and humans are able to learn associations with overlapping features (e.g., A → B and B → C), and can subsequently transfer this knowledge when tested on a novel pairing (A → C). Importantly, MTL damage specifically impairs the ability to perform such transfer, without significantly impacting the ability to learn the individual associations (Buckmaster et al., 2004 ; Bunsey and Eichenbaum, 1996 ; Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997 ; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001 ). Damage to the striatum results in the opposite pattern -impaired feedback-based learning of the individual associations, but spared transfer (Myers et al., 2003 ; Shohamy et al., 2006 ) . Complementing these lesion data, a recent brain-imaging study in humans further suggests a specific role for the hippocampus in such transfer, and highlights a possible mechanism by which such transfer takes place. In this study, participants learned a series of associations using trial and error. Each of the associations in the series was learned individually; however, the associations sometimes overlapped between stimuli. For example, participants learned that A → X, B → X, and A → Y. Participants were tested on transfer of this knowledge to a novel association (B → Y). The results indicated that, during the learning phase, when individual associations were being experienced, the hippocampus was engaged and predictive of subsequent transfer (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008 ) . Thus, consistent with prior reports, these results support a role for the hippocampus in flexible transfer (Heckers et al., 2004 ; Preston et al., 2004 ) .
These findings also provide insight into a possible mechanism by which transfer takes place. By demonstrating that hippocampal activity during the learning itself predicts subsequent transfer, the findings raise the possibility that associative mechanisms in the hippocampus continuously integrate episodes as they are being experienced. This suggests that hippocampal-dependent transfer is essentially a form of generalization, emerging from mnemonic links between learned representations driven by the overlap between them.
The role of the hippocampus in supporting flexible transfer of knowledge provides important insight into one putative mechanism by which the hippocampus contributes to decision making. In particular, beyond the obvious role of explicit memories in modulating value and choice, these data indicate that for long-term memories to adaptively guide future actions and decisions, they must provide a flexible and generalizable representation of the environment .
Interestingly, in the fMRI study described above, successful generalization was also correlated with activation in a midbrain region consistent with the ventral tegmental area (VTA), a region rich in dopamine-containing neurons known to play a role in reward prediction. Further, during learning, activation in the VTA and the hippocampus was highly correlated, suggesting a cooperative interaction between them. Thus, it is possible that dopamine may modulate learning and decision making in situations requiring flexibility and where reward predictions may play only a small role. This highlights a second putative mechanism by which the hippocampus may contribute to decision making: by directly interacting with midbrain dopamine regions to both enhance and to modulate mnemonic representations of value. 
Dopamine and the hippocampus
The novel demonstration of a functional interaction of the dopaminergic midbrain and the hippocampus in successful generalization is not a surprise. In fact, there are several reasons to consider the involvement of the hippocampus in reward-related learning and decision making. Although most research on dopamine in learning has focused on striatal targets, midbrain dopamine neurons also project to the hippocampus (Fuxe, 1965 ; Gasbarri et al., 1994 ; Lindvall and Bjorklund, 1974 ; Swanson, 1982 ) . Dopamine has been shown to modulate cellular learning. For example, dopamine agonists promote longterm plasticity in the hippocampus (Huang and Kandel, 1995 ; Otmakhova and Lisman, 1996 ) , while dopamine antagonists prevent it (Frey et al., 1990 ) . Indicating the behavioral importance of hippocampal dopamine in learning, lesions to the mesolimbic tract have been shown to impair spatial memory (Gasbarri et al., 1996 ) , and dopamine in the hippocampus has been shown to be necessary for long-lasting maintenance of fear memories (Rossato et al., 2009 ).
Novelty, reward, and memory
Dopamine may play a central role in modulating hippocampal-dependent memory for novel episodes. A recent theory suggests that the hippocampus may encode novel events, in part by activating this dopamine response to novelty (Lisman and Grace, 2005 ) , which is consistent with findings that the hippocampus responds to novel stimuli, as do midbrain dopamine neurons (Fyhn et al., 2002 ; Ljungberg et al., 1992 ) . The model builds on the idea that the hippocampus detects novelty by comparing incoming sensory information with existing stored memory representations. Then, when novel information is detected, the hippocampus sends a signal to dopamine neurons in the VTA (relayed through intermediate ventral striatal circuitry). By way of projections from the dopamine neurons back to the hippocampus, the novelty-driven activation of VTA dopamine neurons increases dopamine levels in the hippocampus, facilitating the encoding of the novel information (Huang and Kandel, 1995 ) . In support of this idea, studies demonstrate that increased hippocampal plasticity in response to a novel environment depends on the activation of dopamine receptors (Granado et al., 2008 ; Lemon and Manahan-Vaughan, 2006 ; Li et al., 2003 ) . Dopamine D1-type receptor knockout also alters the ability of hippocampal place cells to adapt coding to a new environment (Tran et al., 2008 ) . In contrast to the notion that the hippocampus and the striatum serve as independent systems, the hippocampus has been shown to exert some control over the striatal dopamine and striatal activity. For example, stimulation of the ventral hippocampus has been shown to enhance the number of spontaneously activated dopamine neurons in the VTA, resulting in significantly greater dopamine release in the ventral striatum (Legault and Wise, 1999 ; Grace, 2006, 2008) . Neuroanatomical studies have shown that the hippocampus projects directly to the ventral striatum, forming a component of the "reward-related" ventral corticostriatal loop (Cohen et al., 2009 ; Haber et al., 2006 ; Haber and Knutson, 2010 ) . Neurophysiological studies suggest that this connection underlies functional interactions between these two regions (Lansink et al., 2009 ; van Krebs et al., 2009 ; Wittmann et al., 2007 ) , consistent with the theoretical model of hippocampal-dopamine interactions in detecting and encoding novel stimuli (Lisman and Grace, 2005 ) .
Other data indicate that interactions between the hippocampus and the midbrain may be essential for successful memory formation. A functional coupling between the MTL and midbrain dopamine regions has been shown to support successful reward-motivated memory formation in humans (Adcock et al., 2006 ) . Furthermore, enhanced midbrain BOLD activity is related to better long-term memory for novel stimuli, for associations between stimuli, and for reward-related stimuli (Schott et al., 2006 ; Schott et al., 2004 ; Wittmann et al., 2005 ) .
"Episodic" prediction errors in the hippocampus
The studies reviewed above suggest that midbrain dopamine neurons and the hippocampus respond to novelty, and that a functional interaction between these systems may promote memory, particularly when there is reward-induced motivation to do so (Lisman and Grace, 2005 ) . The responses to novelty in both the hippocampus and in midbrain dopamine neurons, share characteristics with dopamine neuronal responses to reward. As discussed, evidence points to a role for dopamine neurons in coding deviations from reward expectations -the occurrence of an unexpected reward, or differences between an expected reward and the received reward (Schultz et al., 1997 ) . Similarly, studies in animals and brain-imaging studies in humans suggest that the hippocampus and midbrain dopamine neurons also respond to deviations in the content of an experience, outside of reward, such as signaling the occurrence of a novel and unexpected event, or the nonoccurrence of an expected one (Lisman and Grace, 2005 ; Wittmann et al., 2007 ) .
This raises the intriguing hypothesis that dopamine may code for an "episodic" prediction error. Consistent with this notion, human functional imaging studies demonstrate greater responses in the hippocampus to novel arrangements of stimuli and also to violations of expected sequences of events Maguire, 2006 , 2007) . These results suggest that the hippocampus may have a special role in recognizing and encoding novel information (Kumaran and Maguire, 2009 ) . Emerging data suggest that the novelty response is not only broadly reminiscent of the reward prediction error signal in midbrain dopamine neurons, but that it may be anatomically and physiologically intertwined with it.
Collectively, these studies support a tight linkage between the midbrain dopamine system and the hippocampus in episodic memory formation. Thus, dopamine, which has been primarily associated with stimulus-response learning and value-based decision making, may play an essential role in hippocampal dependent episodic memory.
Episodic representations and transfer of value
How does episodic memory interact with learned value associations to guide decisions? The hippocampus is thought to be particularly important for rapid, relational encoding If there is indeed a cooperative interaction between learned value and relational knowledge, one prediction is that value may come to be associated not only with stimuli that are directly predictive of reward, but may also flexibly transfer or generalize to related stimuli. The generalization of information to novel contexts has been demonstrated in several recent experiments. In one example, generalization across stimuli was observed to guide decisions based on the similarity of reward history between stimuli (Daw and Shohamy, 2008 ) , much as has been reported for generalization based on associative links (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008 ) . This study adapted a typical monetary decision-making task (e.g., Daw et al., 2006 ) to include yoked reinforcement histories between stimuli and found that participants indeed use reward information associated with one stimulus to inform choices about another (related) stimulus (Daw and Shohamy, 2008 ) . This suggests that the human brain has the capability to generalize reward information across stimuli that are similar in terms of their recent reward history, an effect not predicted by simple reinforcement learning models that take into account only the reward history of each stimulus independently.
Decisions may also be more broadly influenced by relations among stimuli established prior to learning. For example, Walther ( 2002 ) investigated the transfer of associations through social relations, using a learning paradigm that probes the generalization of attractiveness. In the study, after rating the attractiveness of a set of face pictures, participants were asked to observe a series of faces. Unbeknownst to the participants, the series included sequential pairs of neutrally rated faces. Participants were then presented with another series of faces, but this time, previously seen neutral faces predicted the appearance of either attractive or unattractive faces. Similar to Pavlovian conditioning, this manipulation was expected to alter attractiveness ratings of the predictive face. Postexperiment liking ratings for the predictive faces indeed shifted in the direction of their associated face. More importantly, they found that this change of value also spread to the paired neutral faces from the first series that had only been seen in a neutral context (Walther, 2002 ) .
Brain mechanisms of preference via value transfer
Relational representations can serve as the basis for flexible generalization of value associations that are learned later, as shown in the above study. This transfer of newly learned value to stimuli that have a pre-established relational representation has been called sensory preconditioning (Brogden, 1939 ) . A value transfer paradigm involves three phases:
(1) pairing of stimuli, (2) conditioning of one member of the pair, and (3) testing the response to both the conditioned stimulus and the stimulus related to it via pairing.
In the original animal sensory preconditioning experiments, relations between two stimuli are established by the simultaneous presentation of stimuli, such as a light and a tone. Subsequently, one member of the pair, such as the tone, is associated with a valued event, such as a foot shock. After conditioning, the animal shows an aversion to the tone. Critically, the animal displays the same aversion to the light. Thus, the value of the conditioned stimulus, learned via repeated stimulus-reward associations, has been transferred to the neutral, paired stimulus. This endows the paired stimulus with the ability to elicit a similar response as the conditioned stimulus, even though it has never been associated with a valued event.
After early research by Brogden and Prodkopaev in dogs (Brogden, 1939 ; Kimmel, 1977 ) , successful demonstrations of value transfer using this paradigm have been shown in multiple other species, including humans (Barr et al., 2003 ; Brogden, 1947 ; Hall and Suboski, 1995 ; Karn, 1947 ; Kojima et al., 1998 ; Muller et al., 2000 ) . 1 What memory systems are involved in value transfer, and how can these systems bias decision making? Value transfer offers an opportunity to study the function and interaction of memory systems, as it involves both relational and stimulus-reward learning processes. The prominent role of relational pairing in the first phase would suggest the involvement of the MTL, given the importance of the MTL in encoding relational information. In the second phase, the repetition of stimulus-reward associations may be expected to engage the striatum and the midbrain dopamine system. Finally, the value acquired via the striatal system must impact the representation of the paired stimulus in some way, shifting its value toward that of the conditioned stimulus, which hints at a functional interaction between these two memory systems.
In support of the idea that the MTL is an essential brain area for successful value transfer, studies have shown that impacting the function of the MTL impairs sensory preconditioning. Animal-lesion studies have demonstrated that lesions to the entire MTL, the perirhinal cortex, or the fimbria, an essential output pathway of the hippocampus, all abolish value transfer in sensory preconditioning, while primary conditioning is left intact (Nicholson and Freeman, 2000 ; Port et al., 1987 ; Port and Patterson, 1984 ; Talk et al., 2002 ; Ward-Robinson et al., 2001 ; but see Ward-Robinson et al., 2001 ). Thus, without a functioning MTL, the ability to form the relational representation between the two initially neutral stimuli is impaired, eliminating the capacity for subsequent value transfer. Computational models of memory systems further support a role of the MTL in sensory preconditioning (Gluck and Myers, 1993 ) .
The striatum, by contrast, is important for learning value association in sensory preconditioning. As reviewed above, the striatum and its dopaminergic afferents play an important role in reward learning. Animals with impaired striatal functioning cannot learn simple instrumental or Pavlovian reward associations, while it has been shown that phasic dopamine signaling in the striatum is sufficient for conditioning (Robinson et al., 2007 ; Smith-Roe and Kelley, 2000 ; Tsai et al., 2009 ).
1 "Value transfer" is used here as a concise description of the long-established findings from sensory preconditioning paradigms. This usage is similar in spirit, but distinct from, the "value transfer theory" of von Fersen ( 1991 ), which was suggested as an alternative account of transitive inference performance in pigeons (von Fersen, 1991 ; Wynne, 1992 A conditioning paradigm similar to value transfer suggests that the sequence of the experimental phases in learning paradigms is also important in determining what memory systems are engaged. Second-order conditioning depends on a pairing phase to transfer value from one stimulus to another, as does sensory preconditioning. Critically, in second-order conditioning, the pairing phase occurs after value learning, when a neutral stimulus is paired with a conditioned stimulus (Gewirtz and Davis, 2000 ) , thus transferring value to the neutral stimulus. In second-order conditioning, the transfer of positive or negative value to a neutral stimulus paired with a conditioned stimulus relies on the basolateral amygdala (Gewirtz and Davis, 1997 ; Hatfield et al., 1996 ; Setlow et al., 2002a ) and connections between the amygdala and the ventral striatum (Setlow et al., 2002b ) , but not the MTL. In sensory preconditioning, however, relations involve neutral stimuli and are formed prior to conditioning, and amygdala lesions have no impact on learning or transfer (Dwyer and Killcross, 2006 ) . In addition to demonstrating the role of the MTL in choice, the dependence of value transfer on an intact MTL and striatum suggests that coordination between these memory systems may be necessary for successful value transfer.
Value transfer in sensory preconditioning
We developed a novel experimental paradigm to test the influence of value transfer on economic decision making in humans. Our aim in this experiment was to address the fundamental question of whether value can transfer and then influence decision making for items that themselves have no reward history. Based on the findings on sensory preconditioning reviewed above, we predicted that paired presentation of stimuli would establish relations between them. During subsequent conditioning, where one member of the pair became a predictor of monetary reward, the pair relation could then support the transfer of value from the conditioned stimulus to the other member of the pair. At test, gamble choices involving the conditioned stimuli would be predicted by their value associations during conditioning. Critically, choices involving the incidentally paired stimuli should be biased in the direction predicted by the newly acquired value of their associated conditioned stimulus, even though these paired stimuli themselves had no experienced association with value.
13.6.1.1 Participants Data are reported from 22 healthy adults (13 females; ages 18-32 years); all were native English speakers. Participants received $12/h plus experimental winnings for participation, with the experiment lasting approximately 1h. Informed written consent was obtained from all participants in accordance with procedures approved by the institutional review board at Columbia University.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases (Fig. 13 .1a-c ):
(1) Incidental pairing phase , during which subjects were exposed to stimulus pairs composed of sequentially presented scene and fractal images; (2) Conditioning phase , during which the fractal stimuli predicted monetary outcome (gain money, lose money, or neither); and (3) Test phase, in which participants were asked to place a gamble on one of two presented stimuli, which were novel combinations of fractals or scenes.
As an additional test measure, stimulus liking ratings were also collected before and after the experiment.
Incidental pairing phase
In the incidental pairing phase, subjects were exposed to five pairs of sequentially presented scene-fractal stimuli (Fig. 13.1a ) . On each trial, a scene stimulus was presented centrally for 2 s, followed by a 2 s fixation, a 2 s fractal stimulus, and finally a 4 s intertrial fixation. Subjects were not instructed about the pairing relation but were exposed to the pairs while performing a separate task, detecting a "target" yellow scene (the target was followed by a unique fractal not subsequently used). The scene-fractal pairs and the target pair each appeared 10 times in a pseudo-random order.
Conditioning phase
To establish value associations with one member of the incidentally paired stimuli, we employed a classical conditioning procedure ( Fig. 13.1b ; following O'Doherty, . Fractal stimuli were used as predictors of monetary reinforcement: a reward-predicting fractal was followed by a gain of $5.00 on 79 % of trials (11/14), a punishment-predicting fractal was followed by a loss of $4.00 on 75 % of trials (12/16; losses were presented 12 times to reach average total winnings of $7), and two neutral fractal stimuli were always followed by a neutral $0.00 outcome. On each trial, a question mark was displayed during a 2 s response period. Subjects were instructed to respond to the question mark with a button press. After the response, one of the four fractal stimuli was presented for 2 s, after which the amount of monetary outcome of that trial appeared below the fractal for 2 s (Fig. 13.1b ) . If the subject did not initiate the trial during the 2 s response period (mean 2.3 ± 3.4 trials per subject), the screen displayed "TOO LATE! -$0.10" and the next trial would begin. Subjects were instructed that all outcomes in the conditioning phase, including those in a brief practice block, would be paid in full at the end of the experiment.
Test phase
After the incidental pairing and conditioning phases, we assessed subjects' learned and transferred preferences using a two-alternative gamble choice test phase. Fractal-fractal or scene-scene stimulus combinations were presented ( Fig. 13.1c ) , and subjects were instructed to choose the stimulus on which they would prefer to place a gamble for a chance of winning $1.00 if making the correct choice. Subjects were instructed that one stimulus in each combination was more "lucky" and more likely to win, and that the goal was to pick the stimulus they thought was luckier and that they liked more. On each trial, the choice stimulus combination was presented on the screen for 3 s, during which the subject indicated her preferred stimulus (left-right stimulus screen position was randomized). The chosen image was then framed for 2 s, followed by a 3 s inter-trial fixation. If no response was made during the response period, both stimuli disappeared and were replaced by the text "TOO LATE! -$0.10." To avoid new learning of stimulus-reward associations, gamble outcomes were not presented during the test phase. However, subjects were instructed that five gamble choices would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to be played for real. All pairings within each stimulus class, including those with the "non-conditioned" fractal and its paired scene, were presented for 2-5 repetitions in a pseudo-random order, yielding 56 gamble test trials. Finally, as an additional test of learning and transfer, we examined the change in fractal and scene liking ratings over the course of the experiment. We collected liking ratings for all the stimuli at the beginning of the experiment and again after the gamble choice test phase. On each rating trial, a stimulus was individually presented above an unmarked line labeled with "Strong Dislike" on the left and "Strong Like" on the right. Subjects used a computer mouse to indicate their degree of liking for a stimulus. Liking ratings, in arbitrary pixel units, were converted to percent of maximum liking for display. Finally, subjects completed a post-task questionnaire that assessed explicit knowledge of the experimental hypotheses, awareness of the stimulus-pairing contingencies, choice strategy in the gamble test phase, and memory for the scene-fractal pairs from the incidental pairing phase (here, subjects were instructed to match the scene and fractal stimuli that "seem to go together"). 
Gamble choices
The value-transfer paradigm included two test measures to examine the effect of value learning and possible value transfer to the paired scene stimuli. First, participants made gambling decisions where they chose to place a gamble on one of two presented fractal stimuli or one of two presented scene stimuli. The percentage of choices to gamble on a stimulus was interpreted as a reflection of the learned preference for that stimulus. For both the fractal and scene stimuli, we performed planned t-tests comparing choice preference for the reward-predicting (or "reward-associated" for the scene stimulus) vs. neutral stimuli to choice preference for the punishment-predicting (-associated) vs. neutral stimuli. We also compared general preference for the reward-predicting (-associated) stimulus vs. all other stimuli to chance (50 % ), and similarly for the punishment-predicting (-associated) stimulus (see Fig. 13 .2 ). Gamble choices involving the fractals exhibited a robust effect of conditioning. Preferences for the reward-predicting vs. neutral fractals compared to punishment-predicting vs. neutral fractals were significantly different (t(21) = 4.26, P<0.001), and similar results were found when comparing vs. the nonconditioned stimulus instead of the neutral stimulus. Participants showed a general preference for the reward-predicting fractal, making significantly more gamble choices on it than would be predicted by chance (t(21) = 8.84, P<0.001; Fig. 13 .2 ). Participants also avoided the punishment-predicting fractal, making significantly fewer gamble choices on it than predicted by chance (t(21) = -3.16, P<0.01; the preference for the reward-predicting fractal was significantly greater than the preference to avoid the punishment-predicting fractal, t(21) = 2.56, P<0.05). Next, we tested the transfer of value to the scene stimuli that were incidentally paired with the fractal stimuli prior to conditioning. Overall, preference for the scene stimuli paralleled the preferences shown for the fractal stimuli, with gamble choices biased toward the direction predicted by the respective related fractal stimulus. Gamble choices for the scene associated with the reward-predicting fractal in the pairing phase vs. the neutral scene, compared to choices for the punishment-related scene vs. the neutral scene, were significantly different (t(21) = 2.85, P<0.01), and similar results were obtained when comparing choices of the reward-related and punishment-related scenes vs. the scene paired with the non-conditioned fractal. Participants also generally gambled significantly more than chance on the scene associated with the reward-predicting fractal vs. all other stimuli (t(21) = 5.11, P<0.001; Fig. 13.2 ) , and, conversely, participants gambled significantly less on the punishment-related scene (t(21) = -1.76, P<0.05 one-tailed; Fig. 13.2 ; gamble preferences showed a trend toward being greater for the reward-associated scene t(21) = 1.92, P<0.10).
Liking ratings
Liking ratings, the second measure of value learning and transfer, also exhibited significant shifts in fractal and scene values. Liking ratings were analyzed in a valenceXtimeXstimulus type ANOVA and two separate valenceXtime ANOVAs for the scene and fractal stimuli. We found a predicted interaction of valence and time (F = 15.56, P<0.001), reflecting successful increases and decreases in liking due to value learning and transfer of value ( Fig. 13.3 ) , as well as a full interaction (F = 11.34, P<0.01), likely driven by the expectedly weaker change in liking for the scene stimuli (but we found no main effect of stimulus type, P > 0.1). Within fractal stimuli, a separate valenceXtime ANOVA revealed a significant interaction(F = 7.54, P<0.05; Fig. 13.3a ) . Planned t-tests revealed that the change in liking ratings from pre-to post-conditioning for both the reward-predicting and the punishment-predicting stimulus were significant (t(21) = 3.73, P<0.001, t(21) = -3.73, P<0.001, respectively). Supporting the value transfer that was found in the gamble test phase, liking ratings for scene stimuli revealed a trend toward the predicted interaction (F = 3.16, P<0.09; Fig.  13.3b ) . Planned t-tests showed a significant increase in liking ratings for the reward-related scene stimulus (t(21) = 2.00, P<0.05, 1-tailed). The change in liking ratings for the punishment-related stimulus was in the predicted direction but did not reach significance.
Finally, we examined whether participants acquired explicit knowledge of the pair relationships in the incidental pairing phase and any other knowledge of the task relationships. Participants did not recall the scene-fractal pairings from the first phase, as post-task scene-fractal matching performance was at chance (mean 19.0 % ± 19.9). Further, responses to various multiple-choice and free-response questions indicated no awareness of the pairing manipulation or experimental hypothesis. While we found no evidence of pairing knowledge, if participants did utilize some memory of the pairs to strategically guide testphase choices, reaction times for scene-gamble choices would be expected to be longer than reaction times for fractal-gamble choices. However, reaction times for scene-gamble choices and fractal-gamble choices differed by less than 80ms (1,250 ms versus 1,327 ms, P<0.05), and while significant, this difference allows little additional time for strategic reasoning. These results collectively suggest that value transfer may not be the result of a Fig. 13.2 Value transfer test phase gamble choices. Fractal stimuli were directly associated with monetary outcomes, while scene stimuli were only incidentally paired with the fractal stimuli prior to conditioning mean of choices for the rewardassociated versus all other stimuli; * P <.01; ** P <.001. test-phase mechanism but may instead be the result of learning processes operating during the pairing and conditioning phases of the experiment.
13.6.1.7 Discussion This experiment demonstrates that relational learning can impact subsequent valuebased decision making. Neutral stimuli were incidentally paired during a relational learning phase, and subsequently, one member of the pair was associated with a monetary value (gain or loss). In a test phase gamble choice task, participants preferred the stimulus that predicted winning money over the stimulus that predicted losing money. Critically, this preference transferred to the neutral stimuli that were only incidentally paired with these predictive stimuli in the first phase, demonstrating a transfer, or generalization, of value. Value transfer was found across two separate measures -gambling choices and changes in stimulus liking -and was found for gain and loss associations. The present results provide an initial demonstration of the use of relational representations in value-based decision making. Future studies will be necessary to explore the boundary conditions of the effect. While value transfer is robust during the time period of the experiment, it is an open question how long this effect can significantly influence behavior. Also, it is not known how many related representations can be updated via value transfer -does value spread only to a few strong relations, or to many incidentally experienced relations? Finally, the current value-transfer paradigm formed relations between stimuli through sequential presentation, but other relational connections, such as spatial associations (e.g., items within a room or a maze), might be predicted to show similar transfer effects, as suggested by past research on temporal and spatial relational encoding in the MTL (Davachi, 2006 ; Kumaran and Maguire, 2009 ).
13.6.1.8 Models of how the hippocampus may contribute to value transfer What is the mechanism underlying value transfer in sensory preconditioning? Transfer could be driven by several distinct mechanisms operating in different phases of the experimental paradigm. First, value transfer could arise purely in the test phase during the presentation of the neutral stimuli, where transfer could be strategic or mediated via flexible associative recollection. While the existence of value transfer in a wide range of animals suggests that a complicated inferential mechanism does not underlie transfer (in these species, at least), the alternative test-phase associative process could be a more broadly applicable mechanism, biasing preference by activating a representation of the reward-associated stimulus and thus the reward. Indeed, a similar mechanism operating in the MTL at test is believed to underlie some types of information generalization in humans (Preston et al., 2004 ) . However, experimental evidence on value transfer in animals, as well as data from the present experiment, argues against such a mechanism in this case. Ward- Robinson and Hall ( 1996 ) utilized a "backwards" sensory preconditioning paradigm, where the first of the incidentally paired stimuli serves as the reward-predicting stimulus, instead of the second. In this manipulation, because of the reversed temporal ordering of the reward associated and neutral pair members, a test-phase transfer mechanism linking the paired stimulus to the reward would require an unlikely series of backwards and forwards associations (Hall, 1996 ; Ward-Robinson and Hall, 1996 ) . Further, in the present experiment, a test-phase mechanism is not supported by the minimal reaction time difference between test-phase fractal choices and scene choices. Also, after the completion of the experiment, participants exhibited a complete lack of knowledge of the pairing relationships. Thus, while definitive experimental data in humans or animals are not yet available, existing data suggest that value transfer is not likely to occur during the test phase.
Value transfer may instead rely on a learning mechanism operating during the earlier incidental pairing or value-learning phases. In one such mechanism, value transfer relies primarily on learning that occurs during the pairing phase. The pairing phase establishes a representation of the neutral stimulus-stimulus pair as a unitary item (Gluck and Myers, 1993 ; Rescorla, 1980 ) . Then, during the conditioning phase, reward presentation would simultaneously affect both members of the unitary pair representation. If so, successful transfer would be predicted by the degree of stimulus-stimulus binding and associated hippocampal activity during the pairing phase.
Alternatively, value transfer in sensory preconditioning could rely on learning during the conditioning phase. After pair representations are established in the incidental pairing phase, presentation of one stimulus would be able to associatively reactivate a representation of the other member of the pair. Thus, during the subsequent conditioning phase, the lone presentation of one stimulus would reactivate the representation of its pair at the same time that reward feedback is being received. A re-encoding process would then be able to associate the reward value with both of the active stimulus representations (Hall, 1996 ) . At the same time, this re-learning process may be aided by the known activation of the hippocampus by unexpected events (Kumaran and Maguire, 2006 ) -the surprising lone presentations of the reward associated stimulus. The hippocampal response to this unexpected and novel event, resembling a kind of prediction error, may be part of a circuit that facilitates re-encoding (Lisman and Grace, 2005 ) . This conditioning-phase reactivation and re-encoding mechanism is similar to the "integrative encoding" mechanism that was proposed to account for a strong correlation between associative generalization and learning phase activation in the hippocampus and VTA (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008 ) . Similarly, in sensory preconditioning, successful transfer may be predicted by hippocampal activation during the conditioning phase.
Studies in animals have offered conflicting results on the learning mechanisms guiding transfer across a variety of paradigms. In experimental and theoretical work, transfer has been argued to be driven by reinforcement learning alone (Couvillon and Bitterman, 1992 ) , reinforcement learning augmented with model-based components (Frank et al., 2003 ; von Fersen et al., 1991 ) , or primarily relational learning (Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997 ) . In the past, these mechanisms were tested in paradigms where putative reinforcement and relational learning processes could happen at the same time, i.e., feedbackbased learning of overlapping associations was itself the basis for building any relations across associations. By contrast, the sensory preconditioning paradigm is unique in that learning of stimulus-stimulus relations takes place first (with no reinforcement), followed by a phase of learning stimulus-outcome associations (with no relational overlap between the stimuli). Thus, this paradigm provides a unique opportunity to tease out reinforcement and relational learning processes and to probe their interaction. In particular, by recording activation across the whole brain in the different phases of sensory preconditioning, functional imaging studies in humans may be uniquely positioned to address some of these controversial questions that have emerged from animal studies.
General discussion

The MTL and decision making
Research in the cognitive neuroscience of decision making has been focused in large part on how people learn value associations from rewards and punishments, and then use this information to inform future choices (Rangel et al., 2008 ) . In particular, as reviewed here, extraordinary advances have been made in understanding the role of the striatum and midbrain dopamine neurons in feedback-driven learning (Schultz, 2006 these learning systems may jointly guide adaptive future behavior: learning values from reinforcement and learning relations from experience are in this sense both "memory in service of the future." Here, we sought to emphasize emerging data indicating that the hippocampus may also contribute to decision making, in two ways. First, given its role in relational, episodic encoding, the hippocampus may be critical for guiding decisions in situations requiring flexible relational representations to make decisions in novel contexts (Myers et al., 2003 ; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008 ) . Second, the hippocampus, like the striatum, is modulated by dopamine neuron projections from the midbrain. Thus, the hippocampus is well positioned to build adaptive memory representations that are modulated by reward and motivation. The hippocampus also projects back to the midbrain, suggesting that episodic memories for the past may help modulate reward related activity in midbrain neurons (Lisman and Grace, 2005 ) . Consistent with this idea, both reward and novelty increase activity in both the hippocampus and midbrain dopamine regions, facilitating subsequent episodic memory (Adcock et al., 2006 ; Wittmann et al., 2007 ) .
Recent research has begun to show how relational representations can be used to adaptively guide decisions. In everyday life, an organism encounters countless "episodes" consisting of associative relations within and between episodes and of associations with value. The research on value transfer in sensory preconditioning suggests that relational learning can form the basis for the transfer of value to related stimuli that are not present at the time of value learning: "[t]he experience of two contiguous sensory stimuli completely divorced from any phasic activity is frequent to any organism. If one of these stimuli becomes the signal for the response of a given reaction-pattern, the other will then elicit a similar response." (Brogden, 1939 ) . Thus, factors in addition to simple reinforcement learning can strongly modulate value associations and guide economic decisions, effects that likely rely on cooperation between the striatum and the hippocampus (Port et al., 1987 ) .
Future explorations of the MTL in generalization
The demonstration, in numerous studies, reviewed above, that relational learning processes can bias behavior suggest numerous future questions. Further exploration of the role of the MTL in decision making can further our understanding of the nature and dynamics of the relations established and the neural systems that underlie these effects. For instance, how persistent is generalization? Can extinction diminish the value of paired stimuli, similar to conditioned stimuli?
Although value learning and decision making is the primary focus of this review, it may also be of interest to explore whether the transfer via relational encoding extends to decisions beyond those guided by value. For example, if the incidental pairing were followed instead by categorization learning (e.g., person 1 is paired with person 2; person 1 prefers chocolate ice cream; what about person 2?), it might be expected that these associations will also generalize (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008 Brogden, 1947 ) . Can the extent of relational learning modulate value transfer? While research suggests that the hippocampus is responsible for encoding relations between stimuli, after extensive training this response could become more "habitual" and more dependent on the dorsal striatum. Repetitions during the pairing phase could eventually impair the relational flexibility underlying transfer, which would diminish the sensory preconditioning effect. Intriguingly, prior research suggests that the amount of relational learning eventually decreases value transfer in animals (Hoffeld et al., 1960 ) , and increased repetition of relational pairs may also decrease the generalization of overlapping associations in humans (Clement et al., 2008 ) .
Social decisions and evaluations may also be influenced by generalization mechanisms. Recent experiments set in social exchange contexts have explored the development of trust, as well as the influence of reputation information, on behavior and brain activation in the striatum (Delgado et al., 2005a ; King-Casas et al., 2005 ) . However, it is possible that social decisions are also influenced by the flexible associations characteristic of the MTL. Most recently, Walther ( 2002 ) demonstrated the transfer of liking in a series of elegant behavioral experiments. Attractiveness spread from an inherently valenced face to a neutral face directly associated with it, and critically, attractiveness also spread to a face only incidentally related to the conditioned face earlier in the experiment (Walther, 2002 ) . It is an interesting question whether generalization can occur for associations that carry value in interpersonal relations, such as good or bad reputations. For example, after the incidental-pairing phase, positive and negative social attributions for particular people could be introduced (e.g., Delgado et al., 2005a ) ; these reputations might be expected to spread by mere association to the paired person.
Other roles for the MTL in decision making
We have emphasized the importance of the hippocampus in decisions that depend on mnemonic flexibility and generalization, but a growing number of studies are exploring other complementary ways that the hippocampus may contribute to decision making. Explicit memory representations may bias economic choices. For example, in an experiment where participants decide between a sooner reward or a later, larger reward, the order and content of accessed memory representations (e.g. "What could you do with the money later?") can eliminate discounting of future rewards (Weber et al., 2007 ) . Another important body of research is exploring how the flexibility of hippocampal representations can support thinking about novel future situations. Patients with damage to the hippocampus are impaired at imaging detailed future scenarios (Hassabis et al., 2007 ; Tulving et al., 1988 ) , and human brain-imaging studies have consistently shown that the hippocampus is activated when participants imagine future scenarios (Addis et al., 2007 ; Botzung et al., 2008 ; Buckner et al., 2008 ; Szpunar et al., 2007 ) . This ability to plan and make decisions about the future has been captured by computational models. Recent proposals suggest that the hippocampus may work in concert with a planning-oriented system in the prefrontal cortex or even as its own decision system (Daw et al., 2005 ; Lengyel and Zilli and Hasselmo, 2008 ) . A major challenge for future research is to provide a unified account of how the hippocampus supports decisions in all of these situations. The current review emphasizes the importance of different memory systems in decision making. In particular, we focused on how a relational memory system based in the hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal cortices may be essential for flexibly deploying knowledge in future decisions. Experimental results from our value-transfer paradigm suggest that relational learning can also influence economic decisions, such as gambling. Although many different types of information can be used to guide novel decisions, this generalization mechanism may be an important influence. Experience often involves learning new relations or recognizing old relational associations, while rewarding events may be fewer and farther in between. By learning relational representations that can serve as a basis for generalizing related value experiences, the brain may be able to take advantage of relational learning to flexibly apply knowledge in novel decisions.
In conclusion, studies of reward learning and decision making have shed light on the important role of the striatum and dopamine in these processes, but many open questions and unexplored areas remain. In everyday experience, we often flexibly use episodic experience to guide our decisions, especially in novel situations, which suggests a prominent role for the hippocampus in decision making. Intriguingly, the hippocampus interacts strongly with the dopamine system to facilitate encoding novel and reward-related stimuli. In some decision situations, this interaction may underlie successful generalization of learning to novel situations. However, the role of a relational hippocampus-based memory system in decision making has so far received little attention. A full understanding of how the brain learns from experience and makes future decisions is a pressing issue in psychology and neuroscience, as understanding these capacities can help us understand everyday actions, and, most importantly, make progress in treating dysfunctions of behavior caused by addiction, disease, and psychiatric disorders. Here, we hope to illuminate one direction for expanding our understanding of flexible decision making, by exploring how learning and memory systems beyond the striatum, such as the hippocampus, can guide our choices.
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